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THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY—OCCUPY WALL 
STREET AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Sarah Kunstler∗ 
Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty—power is ever stealing 
from the many to the few.1 
Wendell Phillips, January 28, 1852 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Occupy movement, starting with Occupy Wall Street in 
Zuccotti Park in New York City, captured the public imagination and 
spread across the country with a force and rapidity that no one could 
have predicted.  The original occupation in New York, the product of 
the efforts of a number of groups,2 was fueled by a call put out by 
Adbusters magazine in July of 2011 featuring the image of a ballerina 
posing atop the iconic bronze bull sculpture of Wall Street—while 
 
∗ The author is grateful to Professors Ellen Yaroshefsky and Holly Maguigan for 
their mentorship and guidance, to Daniel Pearlstein for his research assistance and to 
Jesse Ferguson, Lazar Bloch, Tracy Bunting, and Margaret Ratner Kunstler for their 
invaluable suggestions. 
 1. Wendell Phillips speech in Boston, Massachusetts, (Jan. 28, 1852), in SPEECH-
ES BEFORE THE MASSACHUSETTS ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY 13 (Robert F. Wallcut, No. 
21 Cornhill 1852), available at http://www.archive.org/details/speechesbeforema01 
phil. 
 2. The groups and individuals who helped organize the original Occupy Wall 
Street protest in New York include U.S. Day of Rage, Anonymous, New Yorkers 
Against, and The NYC General Assembly. See Nathan Schneider, Occupy Wall 
Street: FAQ, NATION (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/163719/ 
occupy-wall-street-faq. 
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protesters gather in the background amid a cloud of tear gas—and 
the following text: 
WHAT IS OUR ONE DEMAND? 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET 
SEPTEMBER 17TH. BRING TENT3 
The image was resonant and electrifying.  “Charging Bull,” the giant 
bronze sculpture that stands in Bowling Green Park near Wall Street, 
the symbol of the financial optimism that characterizes a “Bull Mar-
ket,” was to be challenged.  The October 2008 stock market crisis—
together with bank bailouts, high unemployment, and the increasing 
income disparity between the highest earners and everyone else—had 
fostered discontent and hopelessness among those who bore the 
brunt of disastrous financial decisions that appeared to have enriched 
the few at the expense of the many.  To occupy Wall Street was an 
empowering way to give voice to this outrage. It was also an assertion 
of control over Wall Street as a symbol, and the power of the people 
to change its meaning. 
On September 17, 2011, about a thousand demonstrators answered 
the call to Occupy Wall Street, converging in Zuccotti Park in lower 
Manhattan near the New York Stock Exchange.4  Several hundred 
spent the night, and from that day forward, the park was “occupied” 
by demonstrators on a twenty-four-hour basis.5  The numbers were 
small by New York City protest standards; hundreds of thousands of 
New Yorkers had taken to the streets to demonstrate in opposition to 
the imminent Iraq War in 2003.6  But the concept of occupying Wall 
Street was provocative. “We are the 99%,” a popular chant at Occupy 
protests, and the movement’s core slogan, pointed not only to the vast 
wealth inequality between rich and poor, but to the power that Occu-
py movement protesters—that all of us—have to combat inequality 
and injustice: the power of numbers.  Over the course of the weeks 
that followed, many others visited Zuccotti Park, widely known in the 
movement by its original, pre-2006 name of Liberty Square or Liberty 
 
 3. Adbusters also put out an online call to action on its website on July 13, 2011. 
#OccupyWallStreet, ADBUSTERS (July 13, 2011), http://www.adbusters.org/blogs/ad 
busters-blog/occupywallstreet.html. 
 4. See WRITERS FOR THE 99%, OCCUPYING WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF 
AN ACTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA 15–19 (2012). 
 5. Id.  
 6. See Robert D. McFadden, From New York to Melbourne, Cries for Peace, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/nyregion/threats-and 
-responses-overview-from-new-york-to-melbourne-cries-for-peace.html. 
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Plaza.7  Once there, it was difficult to remain a bystander or spectator. 
Everyone was invited to participate directly in the process of deter-
mining what Occupy Wall Street was all about, through the democra-
cy of the “General Assembly,” daily meetings at which collective de-
cisions were made in an open, participatory manner.8 
Adbusters had called for a single demand to emerge from the ac-
tion.9  As the Occupy movement continued over weeks, the press fo-
cused on the lack of a clear demand or demands of the protesters.10  
What was their purpose?  What were they asking for?  The protesters 
themselves, through the General Assemblies, struggled with this is-
sue.11  Various lists of demands were circulated, some held forth by 
the press.  But over time, it became clear that the “demand” was the 
occupation itself and the direct democracy that was taking place 
there.12  The occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York, and of other 
parks and plazas across the country, became model communities that 
literally demonstrated the protesters’ vision of the form a more just 
society might take.  But it was the round-the-clock nature of the pro-
tests that was—and continues to be—the source of their expressive 
power, as well as the concept that unified Occupy protests across the 
country.  The idea that demonstrators were willing to literally put 
their lives and bodies on the line, to physically occupy Wall Street and 
other locations in Washington, D.C., Augusta, Georgia, Fort Myers, 
Florida, Minneapolis, Minnesota and countless other cities and towns, 
in order to call attention to disparities in wealth and power, awakened 
a national discourse about the role of government in meeting the 
 
 7. The park was named Liberty Plaza Park from 1968 until 2006, when it re-
ceived an $8 million renovation by Brookfield Properties, and was renamed Zuccotti 
Park in honor of John E. Zuccotti, the chairman of Brookfield, former City Planning 
Commission chairman and first deputy mayor under Abe Beame. See Schneider, su-
pra note 2. 
 8. The General Assembly, or GA, is the decision-making body of the Occupy 
Movement, as well as the forum by which organizers make sure that the needs of 
those participating are being met. See id. 
 9. See #OccupyWallStreet, supra note 3. 
 10. See, e.g., Meredith Hoffman, Protesters Debate What Demands, if Any, to 
Make, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/nyregion/occ 
upy-wall-street-trying-to-settle-on-demands.html; Miranda Leitsinger, To Demand or 
Not to Demand? That is the ‘Occupy’ Question, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 17, 2011), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45260610/ns/us_news-life/t/demand-or-not-demand-
occupy-question/; Alaina Love, What Occupy Wall Street Demands of Our Leaders, 
WASH. POST, (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/ 
what-occupy-wall-street-demands-of-our-
leaders/2011/10/11/gIQAjHtZcL_story.html. 
 11. See Schneider, supra note 2. 
 12. Id. 
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needs of the people, and the power of people to participate in their 
own governance.  To occupy these spaces was to transform them. 
As the occupations continued over days and weeks, lawyers13 and 
legal workers working with the Occupy movement began to consider 
whether the First Amendment might include a “Right to Occupy.”14  
Over the past eighty years, the protections of the First Amendment 
have expanded to include conduct that has come to be viewed as ex-
pressive, including demonstrating,15 marching,16 leafleting,17 picket-
ing,18 wearing armbands,19 and attaching a peace symbol to an Ameri-
can flag.20  Should these same protections be extended to round-the-
clock occupations, which include activities that were not previously 
viewed as communicative, such as sleeping and camping?  According 
to the Supreme Court, the answer is no. In a 1984 decision in Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence,21 the Court, although ac-
knowledging that sleeping in connection with a twenty-four-hour 
demonstration is somewhat expressive, nonetheless upheld a regula-
tion banning the activity.  This nearly thirty-year-old decision, how-
ever, is not the end of the argument.  The boundaries of First 
Amendment protection of expressive conduct have moved over 
time.22  Once a particular form of conduct is recognized as having suf-
ficient symbolic value, regulations that limit that conduct receive 
greater scrutiny. It is time for First Amendment protections to ex-
pand to include the form that the Occupy protests have taken—
 
 13. The author is a member of the Mass Defense Committee of the National 
Lawyers Guild New York City Chapter, which has coordinated the criminal repre-
sentation of over 2000 people arrested at Occupy Wall Street protests in New York 
City.  
 14. This Article does not address public forum doctrine, but assumes, for purpos-
es of discussion, that the locations chosen by the Occupy Movement are traditional 
public forums for First Amendment expression. “Wherever the title of streets and 
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, 
and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets 
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, 
rights and liberties of citizens.” Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 
515 (1939). 
 15. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
 16. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
 17. See, e.g., Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 18. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
 19. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 20. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
 21. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.2 (2d ed. 1988). 
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twenty-four-hour demonstrations that involve the formation of tent 
cities and model communities, demonstrations that occupy and trans-
form space, demanding new forms of government accountability and 
civic participation. 
I.  SYMBOLIC SPEECH 
The protections of the First Amendment are not limited to the 
communication of ideas through spoken or written words.  In a long 
line of cases, the Supreme Court has afforded First Amendment pro-
tection to “symbolic speech,” expressive conduct that conveys mes-
sages or ideas.  Thus, the flying of a red flag as a gesture for the sup-
port of communism,23 the staging of a sit-in by black patrons in a 
“whites only” library to protest segregation,24 and the wearing of 
black armbands by public school students as a protest against the 
United States policy in the Vietnam War,25 are all expressive acts to 
which the Court has extended Constitutional protections. 
In United States v. O’Brien,26 the Supreme Court established a test 
for reviewing governmental regulation of symbolic expression.  Ac-
cording to the Court, when a regulation prohibits conduct that con-
tains both “speech” and “nonspeech” elements, “a sufficiently im-
portant governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”27  A 
constitutional regulation must 1) be within the constitutional power 
of the government to enact, 2) further an “important or substantial 
government interest,” 3) that interest must be “unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression,” and 4) the infringement “is no greater 
than is essential” to further that interest.28 
On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O’Brien burned his 
Selective Service registration certificate (“draft card”)29 on the steps 
of the South Boston Courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War and 
 
 23. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
 24. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). 
 25. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 26. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 27. Id. at 376. 
 28. Id. at 377. 
 29. Selective Service registration certificates were commonly known as “draft 
cards.” These were small white cards bearing the registrant’s identifying information, 
the date and place of registration, and his Selective Service number, which indicated 
his state of registration, local board, birth year, and his chronological position in the 
local board’s classification record. 
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the military draft.30  He was convicted in federal court for violating a 
1965 federal law that made it a crime to “knowingly destroy” or 
“knowingly mutilate” a draft card.31  O’Brien defended his act as 
“‘symbolic speech’ protected by the First Amendment.”32 
Wary of extending First Amendment protections to all forms of 
expressive conduct, the Court refused to “accept the view that an ap-
parently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever 
the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an 
idea.”33  The Court did not decide whether Mr. O’Brien’s conduct 
implicated the First Amendment, but even assuming that it did, the 
Court reasoned, “it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of 
a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity.”34  In 
fact, the Court found that it was not. Under its newly-minted four-
part test, the Court found that enacting the law was within the power 
of Congress, that the government’s interest in “preventing harm to 
the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service system” 
was sufficiently important, that the law was an appropriately narrow 
means of protecting that interest, limited to the “noncommunicative 
aspect” of O’Brien’s conduct, and therefore unrelated to any inci-
dental suppression of speech.35  The Court declined to look for a con-
nection between the governments’ stated interest and its ban on the 
destruction of draft cards.36  Although the legislative history of the 
law indicated that the decision to punish draft protesters who burned 
their draft cards may have had more to do with the nature of their 
message than the facilitation of a smooth draft process, the Court de-
clined to delve into legislative motive, stating, “It is a familiar princi-
ple of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an oth-
erwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”37 
 
 30. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. 
 31. Act of June 5, 1942, ch. 340, § 462, 56 Stat. 314. 
 32. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 382.  
 36. “The Court was content to demonstrate that the government’s interest in pre-
venting the destruction of draft cards is real, that is, not imaginary or nonexistent. 
But an interest may well be real without being important enough to sustain an 
abridgment of speech.” Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The 
Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23. 
 37. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383. 
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Beyond refusing to accept all expressive conduct as speech, the 
O’Brien Court did not explain how to distinguish between conduct 
deserving of First Amendment protection and conduct outside the 
ambit of that protection.  Six years later, however, in Spence v. Wash-
ington,38 the Court announced a two-part test for determining when 
conduct is to be treated as speech.39  The first factor is whether there 
is intent on the part of those engaging in the conduct to communicate 
a message through the conduct, and the second factor is whether it is 
likely that those observing the conduct will understand the message.40 
In Spence, the Court held that displaying an American flag marked 
with a peace symbol was protected conduct.41 The person engaging in 
the conduct was a college student who was outraged by the invasion 
of Cambodia by United States forces, announced by President Rich-
ard Nixon in a televised address on April 30, 1970, and shooting of 
unarmed college students by members of the Ohio National Guard on 
Monday, May 4, 1970.42  In protest of these events, Harold Spence 
hung an American flag outside the window of his apartment—upside 
down and with peace symbols made out of black tape attached to 
both sides—in order to communicate his belief that the United States 
should stand for peace instead of violence or war.43 
Spence was arrested and charged under a law banning “improper 
use” of the American flag.44  He was convicted after the judge told the 
jury that merely displaying the flag with an attached peace symbol 
was sufficient grounds for conviction, fined $75, and sentenced to ten 
days in jail (suspended).45 In an unsigned, per curiam decision, the 
Supreme Court held that the Washington law “impermissibly in-
fringed protected expression.”46  The timing and circumstances of 
Spence’s conduct distinguished it from “an act of mindless nihilism” 
and transformed it into “a pointed expression of anguish by appellant 
about the then current domestic and foreign affairs of his govern-
ment.”47  The Court noted that Spence had taken action “at a time of 
national turmoil” over the invasion of Cambodia and the killings at 
 
 38. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 410–11. 
 41. Id. at 410.  
 42. Id. at 408. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 406–07. 
 45. Id. at 408. 
 46. Id. at 406. 
 47. Id. at 410. 
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Kent State University.48  “It is difficult now, more than four years lat-
er,” the Court acknowledged, “to recall vividly the depth of emotion 
that pervaded most colleges and universities at the time, and that was 
widely shared by young Americans everywhere.”49 
In Spence, the Supreme Court decided that it is the context in 
which an action is taken that determines whether the action is sym-
bolic speech.  As the late Professor Robert Cover stated: 
[M]any of our actions [can] be understood only in relation to a 
norm. . . . There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday and 
refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and desecrating the 
fast of Yom Kippur, between banking a check and refusing to pay 
your income tax. In each case an act signifies something new and 
powerful when we understand that the act is in reference to a 
norm.50 
The same can be said for symbolic expression.  Covering a flag in 
black tape isn’t per se expressive conduct.  Why you are doing it, what 
you mean to convey, and whether your message is understood are all 
relevant to determining whether a particular medium of expression 
falls under the protections of the First Amendment. 
Spence also illustrates why it is difficult for courts to adjudicate 
these matters as they happen.  Certain acts only become speech 
against the backdrop of the times in which they occur.  At the time 
the conduct in question takes place, it may be the first instance, or 
among the first instances, of a particular form of expressive conduct.  
In Spence, an action that may very well have been viewed as an “act 
of mindless nihilism” on April 29, 1970 was transformed into a pro-
tected form of expressive conduct by what happened in the week that 
followed.51  But in the heat of the moment in which the conduct tran-
spires, it may be difficult for law enforcement or judicial officers to 
see such conduct for what it signifies. 
The Supreme Court had the benefit of time to analyze the context 
of Spence’s actions.  The Court issued its Spence opinion in June 
1974, four years after Kent State and the Cambodian invasion.  In be-
tween the time Spence hung his American flag in protest and the de-
cision of the Court, the Pentagon Papers were published, detailing the 
Defense Department’s secret history of the Vietnam War, and the 
“Watergate” scandal revealed a massive campaign of political spying 
 
 48. Id. at 414, n.10. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Robert Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1983). 
 51. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
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and sabotage.  These events lead to resignations, prosecutions, and 
Senate hearings, and ultimately the resignation of President Nixon on 
August 8, 1974. 
The scope of symbolic speech protection has primarily been de-
fined in the context of cases involving the physical desecration of the 
American flag.52  In Texas v. Johnson, the Supreme Court found that 
a law punishing an individual for burning an American flag in protest 
was a violation of the First Amendment, and therefore unconstitu-
tional.53  In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to both Spence 
and O’Brien for guidance. 
At the outset of its analysis, the Court, per Justice Brennan, 
acknowledged that it “must first determine whether Johnson’s burn-
ing of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to in-
voke the First Amendment in challenging his conviction.”54  The 
Court employed the Spence test, and looked to context to determine 
whether Johnson’s act was communicative in nature.55  Johnson had 
burned the flag as part of a protest during the 1984 Republican Na-
tional Convention in Dallas, Texas, in protest of the nomination of 
Ronald Reagan as the Republican Candidate for a second term as 
President. Within this context, the Court found that “[t]he expressive, 
overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and 
overwhelmingly apparent” and, quoting Spence, “‘sufficiently imbued 
with elements of communication’ to implicate the First Amend-
ment.”56 
After making the determination that Mr. Johnson’s burning of the 
flag was symbolic conduct protected by the First Amendment, the 
Court went on to consider whether the conduct could be regulated.57  
Because Mr. Johnson’s conduct involved both speech and nonspeech 
elements, under O’Brien, the Court needed to consider whether a 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element of the 
conduct justified incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms.  Before reaching the O’Brien factors, however, the Court 
asked, as a threshold question, whether O’Brien was even applicable.  
 
 52. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397 (1989); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974); Spence v. Washington, 418 
U.S. 405 (1974); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
 53. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. The case was argued before the Supreme Court by the 
author’s father, William M. Kunstler.  
 54. Id. at 403. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 406 (citations omitted).  
 57. Id. at 406–07. 
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The Court explained that O’Brien’s “relatively lenient” standard was 
only applicable in cases where “the governmental interest is unrelated 
to the suppression of free expression.”58 
The Court then scrutinized the interests asserted by the Texas gov-
ernment. Texas first claimed that its interest in “preventing breaches 
of the peace” justified Johnson’s conviction for flag desecration.59 The 
Court found that this interest was not implicated by the facts on the 
record as “no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threat-
ened to occur because of Johnson’s burning of the flag.”60  The se-
cond interest asserted by the State of Texas was “an interest in pre-
serving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity.”61  As 
this interest arose out of a concern that a person’s treatment of the 
flag would communicate a different symbolic message, the Court 
found that it was clearly “related ‘to the suppression of free expres-
sion’ within the meaning of O’Brien.”62 
Having found that the government interests were connected to the 
suppression of speech, the Court held that the O’Brien standard did 
not apply, suggesting the need for a stricter standard.63  The Court 
then decided that the Texas statute was not content neutral, as it only 
prohibited burning of the flag that was likely to be offensive to others, 
and not burning the flag for other purposes, such as disposing of a flag 
that was no longer fit for display. Because application of the Texas 
law was dependent upon the content of the burner’s message, the 
Court subjected the State’s interest to “the most exacting scrutiny.”64 
The Court emphasized in Texas v. Johnson that the government 
may not restrict the expression of a message because of its content.65  
The importance of the decision for future cases of symbolic expres-
sion, however, does not lie in its eloquent assertion of content neu-
trality as the “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.”66  
In Johnson, the Court signaled, as it had in Spence, that context is 
important in determining when symbolic acts receive First Amend-
 
 58. Id. at 407 (citations omitted). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 408. The Court noted that “[t]he only evidence offered by the State at 
trial to show the reaction to Johnson’s actions was the testimony of several persons 
who had been seriously offended by the flag burning.” Id. 
 61. Id. at 410. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)). 
 65. Id. at 414. 
 66. Id.  
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ment protection.67  But unlike in Spence, the Court looked to the con-
text of the regulation itself—the motivation of the government in 
regulating the conduct, balancing the competing interests of the ex-
pressive activity and the governmental purpose for restricting that ac-
tivity.68  Even before it examined the content neutrality of the Texas 
law, the Court found that the O’Brien test was inapplicable because 
the state’s interest was connected to the suppression of speech.69 
The Johnson Court’s sensitive analysis of the rights and interests at 
stake—present in many of the Court’s earlier decisions recognizing 
and protecting symbolic speech—is missing from the Court’s holding 
in O’Brien.  In O’Brien, the Court assumed, without deciding, that 
O’Brien’s burning of his draft card implicated the First Amendment, 
and accepted, without scrutinizing, the government’s stated interest 
for passing the draft card regulation.  Unfortunately, when evaluating 
the scope of First Amendment protections in the context of twenty-
four-hour protests, the trend in symbolic speech law appears to be 
more in line with O’Brien and protecting government interests at the 
expense of the expressive rights of individuals. 
II.  SYMBOLIC SLEEPING AND THE COURTS 
The concept of the twenty-four-hour protest as protected symbolic 
and expressive conduct is not unique to the Occupy movement.  Over 
the past forty years, it has been litigated primarily in connection with 
protests in Washington D.C. on the National Mall and in Lafayette 
Park, which sits directly across the street from the White House.70  It 
is easy to see why; our Nation’s capitol is a traditional and longstand-
ing forum for citizens wishing to bring their grievances to the United 
States government.  The majority of protests and rallies that take 
place there are one-day events, where participants show up, air their 
grievances, and go home.  But over the past century, there have al-
ways been protests in which protesters have “occupied” parts of the 
 
 67. See id. at 405. 
 68. See id. at 406–07. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-violence v. Watt (CCNV I), 670 F.2d 
1213 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (sleeping in Lafayette Park); United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 
984 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (sleeping in Lafayette Park); Vietnam Veterans Against the War 
v. Morton (VVAW), 506 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (camping on Mall); Quaker Action 
Grp. v. Morton (Quaker Action), No. 71-1276 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 1971), vacated 
mem., 402 U.S. 926 (1971) (camping on Mall). 
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Capitol for a longer period of time in order to express the seriousness 
of their grievance and more effectively communicate their message.71 
In 1976, in United States v. Abney, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia invalidated a National Parks Service regulation 
prohibiting camping after a World War II veteran was convicted for 
sleeping in Lafayette Park during a round-the-clock vigil to protest 
his treatment by the Veterans Administration (VA).72  For thirty 
years, Stacy Abney, a sixty-four-year-old Texas farmer, had been in a 
dispute with the VA over disability benefits.  During that time, he had 
traveled to Washington, D.C. on multiple occasions to meet with VA 
officials, whose headquarters bordered Lafayette Park. After being 
denied benefits for the ninth time, Mr. Abney “went across the street 
to the park to take up a round-the-clock vigil protesting his treatment 
at the hands of the VA.”73  Carrying a sign that said “I will stay here 
until I get my VA rights,” Abney was arrested eleven times for sleep-
ing in Lafayette Park and was sentenced to thirty days in jail.74 
The D.C. Court did not apply the Spence test to determine the ex-
pressive nature of Mr. Abney’s conduct, nor did it apply the O’Brien 
test to determine the propriety of the government of the regulation.  
By focusing on Mr. Abney’s intent and the circumstances surrounding 
his conduct, however, the Court applied a Spence-like analysis, find-
ing that “[i]n the unusual circumstances here presented, Abney’s 
sleeping must be taken to be sufficiently expressive in nature to im-
plicate First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance.”75  Although 
the Court failed to explain why Mr. Abney’s circumstances were “un-
usual,” it is likely that the sign he carried, which explained his pur-
pose, together with the physical proximity of his protest to the VA 
headquarters, created a context for the Court that clearly communi-
cated Mr. Abney’s intent and message.  “Obviously,” the Court rea-
soned, “given appellant’s concept of the purpose underlying his con-
 
 71. The first of the “tent city” protests was likely the “Bonus Army” protests of 
1932. In May of that year, with unemployment soaring to almost twenty-five percent, 
tens of thousands of World War I veterans, their families and supporters set up en-
campments demanding payment of the “bonus” promised to veterans, but deferred 
until 1945. The protest lasted until the encampments were evacuated by force on July 
28, 1932. See generally PAUL DICKSON & THOMAS B. ALLEN, THE BONUS ARMY: AN 
AMERICAN EPIC (2004). 
 72. United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 984, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 73. Id. at 985. 
 74. Lance Gay, Jailed Veteran’s VA Protest in Park Ruled Legal, WASH. STAR 
(May 1, 1976), http://prop1.org/history/1776plus/76abney.htm. 
 75. Abney, 534 F. 2d at 985. 
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duct, this necessitated sleeping in the park.”76  The Court then exam-
ined the Park Service regulation, which prohibited “[s]leeping, loiter-
ing or camping, with intent to remain for a period of more than four 
hours . . . except upon proper authorization of the Superintendent.”77  
Because the regulation gave the Superintendent unfettered discretion 
to deny or permit sleeping in the park, the Court found it unconstitu-
tional.78 
In a pair of cases that arose out of protests organized by the Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia reiterated its view that sleep could be 
speech-related.79  In the fall of 1981, CCNV applied to the National 
Park Service for a permit to hold a demonstration calling attention to 
the plight of the homeless in Lafayette Park.80  The Park Service 
granted CCNV a permit to erect nine “symbolic tents” and to have a 
continuous, twenty-four-hour presence in the park, but prohibited 
sleeping, which it contended was prohibited under its newly enacted 
regulation banning camping “primarily for living accommodation” 
outside of designated campsites.81  In Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Watt (CCNV I), the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia found that sleeping in symbolic tents was consistent with 
“the use of symbolic campsites,” which was permitted under the regu-
lation.82  Holding that “in this case sleeping itself may express the 
message that these persons are homeless and so have nowhere else to 
 
 76. Id. at 987. 
 77. 36 C.F.R. § 50.25(k) (1975). 
 78. Mr. Abney later moved his protest to the Capitol steps. In 1996, at age 84, he 
was still out there protesting. “I’m a 24-hour demonstrator,” he told a reporter. He 
lived in a cardboard box beneath the steps for at least twenty years. T. M. Hartmann, 
Homeless Demonstrator Lives Under Capital Steps, CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 
12, 1996), http://www.journalism.umd.edu/cns/wire/1996-editions/03-March-editions/ 
960312-Tuesday/HomelesMan_CNS-UMCP.html. 
 79. See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt [hereinafter CCNV I], 
670 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt [hereinafter 
CCNV II], 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 80. CCNV I, 670 F.2d at 1214. 
 81. The relevant text of the National Park Regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 50, enacted on 
November 13, 1981, is as follows: “Camping is prohibited in all park areas except 
those specially designated as official campsites (36 CFR 50.27). The National Park 
Service does permit the use of symbolic campsites reasonably related to First 
Amendment activities. However, camping primarily for living accommodation must 
be confined to designated campsites.” No such campgrounds have ever been desig-
nated in Lafayette Park or the Mall. 
 82. Having found that sleeping in symbolic campsites was consistent with the Na-
tional Park Service’s own regulation, the D.C. Court did not pass on the constitution-
ality of the regulation itself. CCNV I, 670 F.2d at 1217. 
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go,” the Court based its ruling on the “uncontroverted evidence” that 
the purpose of the campsites was primarily to express the problems of 
the homeless and not to serve as living accommodations.83 
After CCNV I, the Park Service modified its regulation to expand 
the definition of camping.84  The new regulation stated that sleeping 
or using tents or other structures for sleeping “constitute camping 
when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the 
participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area 
as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants 
or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engag-
ing.”85  In banning sleeping “regardless of the intent of the partici-
pants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be 
engaging,” the Park Service’s intention was, in light of the Court’s de-
cision in CCNV I, to expressly prohibit sleeping in symbolic 
campsites.86 
In the fall of 1982, as it had done the year before, the Park Service 
granted a permit request from CCNV to conduct a wintertime pro-
test, this time in both Lafayette Park and on the Mall, for the purpose 
of demonstrating the plight of the homeless.  The permit authorized 
the construction of two symbolic tent cities; twenty tents accommo-
dating fifty people in Lafayette Park, and forty tents accommodating 
up to a hundred people on the Mall.  Citing its newly modified regula-
tion, the Park Service denied CCNV’s request that demonstrators be 
permitted to sleep in the symbolic tents.  CCNV filed an action seek-
ing to invalidate the ban on sleeping as an unconstitutional restriction 
of their First Amendment rights. Finding that the government had 
failed to show that a ban on sleeping—in the context of a round-the-
clock protest for which it had already granted permission—furthered 
any legitimate government interest, the Court of Appeals for District 
of Columbia granted CCNV’s request for an injunction.87 
The CCNV II court began its analysis with an application of the 
Spence test, looking to the intent of the actor and the context of his or 
her conduct. The court found that the intent of the protesters was “to 
create an inescapable night-and-day reminder to the nation’s political 
leadership that homeless persons exist.”88  Looking at “the context of 
 
 83. Id. at 1216–17. 
 84. 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1983). 
 85. Id. (emphasis added).  
 86. Id. 
 87. CCNV II, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 88. Id. at 594. 
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a large demonstration with tents, placards, and verbal explanations” 
protesting the plight of the homeless, the court found the “pointed 
use of the simple act of sleeping” permeated with “the indicia of polit-
ical expression.”89  The court compared the twenty-four-hour “pres-
ence” of the CCNV demonstrators in Lafayette Park and the Mall to 
the “reproachful presence” of civil rights activists protesting segrega-
tion in a silent vigil in a public library in Brown v. Louisiana,90 and 
found that the CCNV demonstration was “identical in both concept 
and purpose to such conduct.”91  Given the context and intent of the 
demonstration, the court found that CCNV’s presence “at the seat of 
our national government” was “entitled to the same First Amend-
ment protection as a vigil,” regardless of whether the protesters were 
sitting down, lying down or sleeping.92 
The court then turned to an examination of the regulation itself. 
Applying O’Brien, the court looked to the governmental interests put 
forth by the Park Service, noting that “[t]he right to use a public place 
for expressive activity may be restricted only for weighty reasons.”93  
The interests identified by the Park Service were (1) preserving park-
land for the use of others, the possibility of (2) damage to park re-
sources or (3) sanitation problems, (4) the overburdening of law en-
forcement officers, and (5) a concern that permitting sleeping would 
result in an increase in requests for sleeping by demonstrators and 
non-demonstrating visitors.94 
The CCNV II court then considered whether these interests were 
furthered by prohibiting expressive sleeping in a permitted demon-
stration in which protesters had received permission to maintain a 
twenty-four-hour presence and erect symbolic tents.95  The court 
found that preserving parkland for the use of others was not an issue, 
because the CCNV protesters had already been granted use of the 
space.96  Further, because protesters were already permitted to “sit, 
stand or even lie down” in the symbolic tents, prohibiting sleeping 
would not serve to protect park resources, reduce sanitation prob-
lems, or conserve law enforcement resources.97 
 
 89. Id. at 593. 
 90. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1965). 
 91. CCNV II, 703 F.2d at 594.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 595 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
 94. Id. at 595–96. 
 95. Id. at 596. 
 96. Id. at 597. 
 97. Id. at 596. 
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Finally, the court addressed the Park Service’s concern that permit-
ting sleeping would result in an increase in requests for sleeping by 
demonstrators and non-demonstrators.  As far as non-demonstrators, 
the court questioned whether permitting sleeping in this case would 
really generate an increase in requests by ordinary citizens with a de-
sire to sleep on the Mall, but found that the Park Service was free to 
apply its anti-camping regulations to such applicants.98  For demon-
strators seeking permission to sleep, the court found that the Park 
Service could draw a distinction between those seeking to sleep for 
convenience, and those seeking to express themselves as part of a 
twenty-four-hour vigil, but that “it may not deny all such requests 
merely because it expects a large number of people to apply.”99 
Finding that the Park Service had failed to demonstrate that its in-
terests would be furthered by a ban on sleep, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia granted an injunction in favor of 
CCNV.100  This victory for the First Amendment rights of demonstra-
tors was short-lived; in Clark v. Community of Creative Non-
Violence, decided one year later in 1984, the Supreme Court over-
turned the Court of Appeals decision, finding that the Park Service 
regulation prohibiting camping did not violate the CCNV demonstra-
tors’ First Amendment rights.101 
Although the court of appeals’ decision in CCNV II, like Texas v. 
Johnson, is an example of a court utilizing Spence and O’Brien as a 
framework for careful balancing of government interests and First 
Amendment rights, the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark is an ex-
ample of an O’Brien-like decision that accepts government interests 
but fails to scrutinize whether those interests are actually served by 
the regulation, and fails to examine the symbolic value of the expres-
sive conduct.  As in O’Brien, the Court in Clark assumed, without de-
ciding, that “overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration 
is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amend-
ment.”102  The Court then went directly to an analysis of whether the 
conduct could be regulated.  The Court noted that it could apply ei-
ther the O’Brien test for regulating symbolic conduct, or the standard 
 
 98. Id. at 597–98. 
 99. Id. at 598. 
 100. Id. at 599. 
 101. 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
 102. Id. at 293. 
KUNSTLER_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:25 AM 
2012] THE RIGHT TO OCCUPY 1005 
applied to time, place and manner restrictions.103  It opted to apply 
time, place and manner analysis, which requires that restrictions “are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that 
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental inter-
est, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for commu-
nication of the information.”104  The Court then found that the regula-
tion prohibiting camping satisfied this test. The regulation, the Court 
held, was content neutral as it applied to all camping, and was not be-
ing applied here because of the message of CCNV’s symbolic camp-
ing; that without sleeping, the protesters had ample alternative means 
within the context of their twenty-four-hour vigil to communicate 
their message; and that it was narrowly tailored to the “Government’s 
substantial interest in maintaining the parks in the heart of our Capi-
tal in an attractive and intact condition.”105 
Central to the Court’s opinion was its perception that the ban on 
sleeping did not detract from the demonstrators’ message.  Without 
employing the Spence test, the Court found it “evident that its major 
value to this demonstration would be facilitative,” in that it enabled 
homeless protesters to attend the demonstration who would not oth-
erwise be able to attend.106  But by failing to look at the act of sleep-
ing within the context of CCNV’s planned demonstration, the Court 
was able to effectively ignore its meaning.  As Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall noted in his dissenting opinion, 
It is true that we all go to sleep as part of our daily regimen and that, 
for the most part, sleep represents a physical necessity and not a ve-
hicle for expression. But these characteristics need not prevent an 
activity that is normally devoid of expressive purpose from being 
used as a novel mode of communication. Sitting or standing in a li-
brary is a common-place activity necessary to facilitate ends usually 
having nothing to do with making a statement.  Moreover, sitting or 
standing is not conduct that an observer would normally construe as 
 
 103. Although not addressed in this Article, it is worth nothing that the O’Brien 
test and the time, place, manner standard are not interchangeable and should not be 
used interchangeably.  The O’Brien test has a higher standard, requiring that the re-
striction be “no greater than is essential” to further the governmental interest, as it 
recognizes that a regulation that prohibits expressive conduct acts forecloses that par-
ticular form of expression. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. A time, place, manner restriction 
assumes that the actor is still free to engage in the same form of expression at another 
time, in another place, or in another manner, and therefore only requires that the 
government leave open “ample alternative channels.” Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
 104. Clark, 568 U.S. at 293.  
 105. Id. at 295–96. 
 106. Id. at 296. 
KUNSTLER_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:25 AM 
1006 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
expressive conduct. However, for Negroes to stand or sit in a 
“whites only” library in Louisiana in 1965 was powerfully expressive; 
in that particular context, those acts became “monuments of pro-
test” against segregation.107 
Like Robert Cover, who acknowledged that certain acts of rebel-
lion can only be understood when viewed in relation to a norm,108  
Justice Marshall saw that the demonstrators were creating a “novel 
mode of communication” out of an activity that is normally facilita-
tive in nature. In the context of CCNV’s demonstration, the act of 
sleeping outdoors, in winter, was powerful symbolic expression, a way 
to “re-enact the central reality of homelessness.”109  As Judge Ed-
wards wrote in his concurring opinion for the appellate court in 
CCNV II: “[the protesters] can express with their bodies the poignan-
cy of their plight.  They can physically demonstrate the neglect from 
which they suffer with an articulateness even Dickens could not 
match.”110  Unfortunately, in Clark, the Majority saw only the norm, 
and not the new form of expression that was being created in relation 
to that norm.  From this standpoint, it was easy for the Court to dis-
count its symbolic value and find that the protesters had ample alter-
native channels to express their message. 
Justice Marshall saw symbolic speech as an evolving form of ex-
pression, and believed that First Amendment law must evolve with it.  
By recalling the library sit-in from Brown v. Louisiana,111 he was re-
minding the Court that the essence of symbolic speech jurisprudence 
(and the role of the Supreme Court) is the recognition of this evolu-
tion. Justice Marshall looked at activities that were not previously 
understood to be communicative, and acknowledged that something 
new is happening that is deserving of First Amendment protection.  
Although Justice Marshall recognized the importance of the Court’s 
role in protecting new forms of communication, the majority clearly 
did not. Implicit in the Court’s decision is a concern that extending 
First Amendment protection to sleep would undoubtedly lead to a 
rise in the number of groups who would “demand permission to de-
liver an asserted message by camping,” and that some “would surely 
 
 107. Id. at 306. 
 108. Cover, supra note 50. 
 109. Clark, 468 U.S. at 303–04.  
 110. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt (CCNV II), 703 F.2d 586, 601 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
 111. 383 U. S. 131 (1966). 
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have as credible a claim in this regard as does CCNV.”112  In short, 
the Court anticipated future protests, such as the Occupy movement, 
which would seek to express themselves through sleep, and issued a 
decision that undervalued the expressive value of the conduct to justi-
fy a regulation that prohibited it altogether. 
For better or for worse, the 1984 Clark decision is the Supreme 
Court’s last word on sleep as symbolic speech, and it is within this 
landscape that Occupy movement cases asserting a First Amendment 
right to occupy will be decided. 
III.  THE LANDSCAPE OF SYMBOLIC SLEEP PROTECTION AFTER 
CLARK V. CCNV 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark, the federal 
courts, including those considering recent Occupy movement pro-
tests, have either found or assumed that overnight sleeping, tent cities 
and temporary shanties can be a form of symbolic communication 
protected by the First Amendment.113  In at least two cases predating 
the Occupy movement, federal courts have enjoined the enforcement 
of regulations or policies prohibiting sleeping or the erection of sym-
bolic structures, finding that the regulator’s interests were outweighed 
by the First Amendment rights of demonstrators. 
In 1986, in University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. Pe-
terson,114 Judge Aldon J. Anderson of the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah granted a permanent injunction to stu-
dents seeking to enjoin the university from removing symbolic South 
African shanties representing “the oppressive conditions suffered by 
blacks in South Africa”115 erected on campus in protest of apartheid 
and the university’s investment policies.  After allowing the structures 
 
 112. Clark, 486 U.S. at 297; see Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966)  
(Black, J., dissenting) (“[I]f one group can take over libraries for one cause, other 
groups will assert the right to do so for causes which, while wholly legal, may not be 
so appealing to this Court.”). 
 113. See U.S. v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878 (11th Cir.1991); Acorn v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 
835 F.2d 735, 742 (10th Cir. 1987); Occupy Columbia v. Nikki Haley, Governor of 
South Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03253, 2011 WL 6318587 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 2011); Occu-
py Minneapolis v. County of Hennepin, No. 11–3412, 2011 WL 5878359 (D. Minn. 
Nov. 23, 2011); Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, No. 2:11–cv–00608, 2011 
WL 5554034, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2011); Metropolitan Council Inc. v. Safir, 99 F. 
Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O’Neil, 660 F. 
Supp. 333, 337 (W.D. Va. 1987); University of Utah Students Against Apartheid v. 
Peterson, 649 F.Supp. 1200, 1202 (D. Utah 1986). 
 114. Peterson, 649 F. Supp. at 1200. 
 115. Id. at 1202. 
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to remain for six months, the University of Utah, citing potential tort 
liability and the cost of protecting the shanties, told the students to 
take them down. 
Applying the test articulated by the Supreme Court in Spence v. 
Washington, Judge Anderson concluded that the shanties were sym-
bolic speech, there was an intent to convey a particularized message, 
and it was likely that the message would be understood.116  Shanties, 
the court found, 
have come to symbolize the poverty, oppression and homelessness 
of South African blacks and have been used by student groups 
throughout the United States to convey this same message. Much 
like a flag, a cross, or the black armbands used during the Vietnam 
war, the shanties are now understood to represent a strong state-
ment condemning apartheid and protesting university investment in 
South Africa.117 
Because the shanties had become such widely recognized symbols, 
Judge Anderson found it “hard to imagine a more effective transmis-
sion of a message.”118  Judge Anderson distinguished the shanties on 
the University of Utah campus from cases like Clark v. Community 
for Creative Non-Violence, which involved more “ambiguous” forms 
of conduct.  In these cases, “these types of conduct frequently occur 
for noncommunicative reasons and thus blur any message intended to 
be conveyed.”119  Judge Anderson noted that in Clark, sleep was such 
an activity, and therefore made it difficult to determine the symbolic 
value of the conduct.  Because sleep served other non-communicative 
purposes, the Clark Court was “skeptical of the actual intent of the 
protesters in including sleep as part of the protest.”120 
Judge Anderson did not spend much time examining the Universi-
ty of Utah’s asserted interests, as he was troubled by the fact that the 
decision to remove the shanties was not based on a formal regulation.  
Without written regulations, the court found it impossible to deter-
mine whether the university’s restriction on the First Amendment 
rights of its students was constitutional under a time, place and man-
ner analysis.121  In light of the University of Utah’s concern regarding 
 
 116. Id. at 1204–05. 
 117. Id. at 1205. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1207. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 1210–11. 
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nighttime vandalism, however, the court found it reasonable to order 
that the shanties be removed at night.122 
In Metropolitan Council, Inc. v. Safir,123 Judge Kimba M. Wood of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York found that a New York City Police Department policy banning 
sleeping on New York City sidewalks violated the First Amendment 
rights of demonstrators, who had planned a protest which involved 
“using public sleeping as a means of public expression.”124  In June 
2000, Metropolitan Council, Inc., a tenant’s rights organization, had 
planned a demonstration to protest proposed rent increases for rent-
regulated apartments in New York City. The demonstration, which 
began with an evening press conference in Carl Schurz Park next to 
the Mayor’s residence at Gracie Mansion, was to include a five-hour 
vigil in the park with protesters lying on the ground “in order to sym-
bolically convey the additional homelessness that plaintiff alleges will 
result from the rent increases.”125  After the park closed at 1 a.m., the 
plan was for the vigil to move to the sidewalk across the street from 
Gracie Mansion, where demonstrators would sleep overnight. 
Because the parties agreed that “the proposed activity of lying and 
sleeping on the City sidewalks has an expressive component in the 
context of this vigil,” Judge Wood went directly to an examination of 
the interests at stake, balancing the protestors’ “interest in engaging 
in expressive activity” with the City’s “interest in preventing people 
from lying and sleeping on City sidewalks.”126  Citing Clark, Judge 
Wood applied the test for time, place, and manner restrictions. Judge 
Wood gave credence to the City’s asserted interests—to protect 
sleeping individuals from the dangers of the street and to prevent 
sleepers from obstructing pedestrians—but found that in the context 
of the planned protest, a total ban on public sleeping was not narrow-
ly tailored to serve these interests, as the demonstrators planned to 
leave ample sidewalk space for pedestrian passage and to employ 
marshals who would protect the sleepers and make sure that they did 
not block the sidewalk.127 
 
 122. Id. at 1211. 
 123. Metropolitan Council Inc. v. Safir, 99 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 124. Id. at 439. 
 125. Id. at 439–40. 
 126. Id. at 443–44. 
 127. Id. at 445. The court also noted that the City planned to staff the protest, as it 
did every large well-publicized demonstration, with police officers protecting its in-
terests. Id. 
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After finding that symbolic sleeping was expressive conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment, and that the City’s total ban on 
sleeping was not a valid time, place, and manner restriction, Judge 
Wood distinguished Metropolitan Council from Clark.128  Unlike 
Clark, this was “a case in which a subset of conduct falls within the 
parameters of the ban and yet fails to implicate the interests allegedly 
supporting the ban.”129  In Clark, the court reasoned, the ban on 
camping needed to apply to demonstrators and non-demonstrators 
alike, because permitting sleeping in the park by either group could 
damage the parks and make them inaccessible to other users.130  
Here, there was a vast difference between the behaviors at which the 
ban was aimed (homeless persons and intoxicated individuals) and a 
planned, organized, political protest.  “Because the suppression of 
any such protest to the extent that it involves the symbolic use of 
sleeping or lying on the ground is utterly unnecessary to further the 
interests that underlie the sleeping ban, the Court concludes that the 
ban is not narrowly tailored to the asserted interests.”131  Judge Wood 
further distinguished Clark on the grounds that the “major value” of 
sleeping to the CCNV protest was “primarily facilitative,” in that it 
enabled homeless protesters to participate.132  “[H]ere,” the court ex-
plained, “sleeping plays a more significant expressive role relative to 
other aspects of the protest.”133 
Crucial to the court’s decision was its view that the City’s ban on 
sidewalk sleeping operated as a prior restraint on speech.134  The City 
had argued that the legal basis for its total ban on public sleeping was 
that it furthered the purposes of the local penal law on disorderly 
conduct, which prohibits the obstruction of “vehicular or pedestrian 
traffic” when it is done “with the intent to cause public inconven-
ience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.”135  
The City was free to arrest protest participants whom it believed had 
engaged in disorderly conduct, but to arrest them for symbolic sleep-
ing on the theory that they might block pedestrian passage if allowed 
to continue their protest was repugnant to the court.   
 
 128. Id. at 446. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Clark v. Community of Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984). 
 131. Metropolitan Council, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
 132. See id. at 446 n.12. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 448–49. 
 135. N.Y. CRIM. LAW § 240.20[5] (McKinney 2010). 
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Here, where core First Amendment rights to political protest are at 
stake, where the City concedes that this vigil itself will not cause any 
public disorder, and where the City’s authority to treat sleeping as 
per se disorderly conduct is far from clear, the equities weigh heavily 
in favor of permitting this protest to go forward without restraint.136 
Despite the distinctions drawn by the district court between the 
Metropolitan Council protest against rent regulations and CCNV’s 
protests concerning the plight of the homeless, it is difficult to see 
how symbolic sleep was more expressive at one demonstration than 
the other.  Like the Metropolitan Council protest, the primary pur-
pose of sleep at the CCNV protest was symbolic.137  The fact that the 
symbolic sleeping component of the protest may have also facilitated 
the presence of homeless participants does not lessen its symbolic 
value.138  Further, it is not at all clear that the Park Service’s ban on 
camping was aimed at sleeping at demonstrations in which permission 
for the erection of tents and a twenty-four-hour presence had already 
been granted, and that prohibition of sleeping at this protest fur-
thered the interests underlying the camping ban. 
A superficial reading of Clark, University of Utah, and Metropoli-
tan Council, suggests that the cases may turn on whether there was a 
written regulation at the time of the demonstration banning the con-
duct in question.  In University of Utah and Metropolitan Council, 
the decisions to remove the shanties or ban sleeping were informal 
policy decisions as opposed to written regulations.  But that cannot be 
the end of the inquiry.  Even when a written regulation exists, the 
government’s asserted interest underlying the regulation must be im-
portant or substantial.  The regulation must be narrowly tailored to 
that interest.  And the interest must be carefully balanced against the 
First Amendment rights of the people who seek to engage in the pro-
hibited conduct as symbolic speech.139  The difference in outcomes in 
these three cases may in truth have more to do with the results of this 
balancing; the relative weight given by the respective courts to the 
 
 136. Metropolitan Council, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
 137. As one of the homeless CCNV participants explained, “Sleeping in Lafayette 
Park or on the Mall, for me, is to show people that conditions are so poor for the 
homeless and poor in this city that we would actually sleep outside in the winter to 
get the point across.” Clark v. Cmty. of Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304 
(1984). 
 138. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent in Clark, “The facilitative purpose of 
the sleep-in takes away nothing from its independent status as symbolic speech. 
Moreover, facilitative conduct that is closely related to expressive activity is itself 
protected by First Amendment considerations.” Id. at 310 n.7. 
 139. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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symbolic value of the conduct and the interests asserted by the gov-
ernment in suppressing that conduct.  This is certainly the more im-
portant distinction for the Occupy movement and future demonstra-
tors who express themselves through sleep. Metropolitan Council, 
decided sixteen years after Clark and fourteen years after University 
of Utah, points the way towards a future in which symbolic sleeping 
may no longer be viewed as ambiguously expressive, and “occupa-
tions,” like sit-ins, boycotts, and pickets, may be widely recognized by 
the courts as an oft-used tool of protest and a clear form of expres-
sion. 
IV.  THE OCCUPY MOVEMENT IN THE COURTS 
At the time of this writing, the Occupy movement is in the process 
of litigating the right to occupy in courts across the country.  In many 
places, the battle to maintain a twenty-four-hour occupation has al-
ready been lost.  Courts, while finding that the Occupy protests, in-
cluding tent cities and overnight camping and sleeping, are sufficient-
ly expressive to trigger the First Amendment, have in the same breath 
allowed these protected activities to be regulated out of existence by 
the municipalities in which they take place.140 
In Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, for example, the dis-
trict court held that sleeping and camping within the context of the 
Occupy protest at Centennial Park in downtown Fort Meyers was 
symbolic conduct protected by the First Amendment, reasoning that 
“[t]he conduct of tenting and sleeping in the park 24 hours a day to 
simulate an ‘occupation’ is intended to be communicative and in con-
text is reasonably understood by the viewer to be communicative.”141  
While finding that ordinances on parade permitting,142 loitering,143 
and after-hours park use144 restricted the First Amendment rights of 
the protesters, the district court upheld an ordinance prohibiting set-
ting up “tents, shacks, or any other temporary shelters for the purpose 
of overnight camping” or living beyond closing hours in any such 
 
 140. See Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, No. 2:11–cv–00608, 2011 WL 
5554034 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 15, 2011); Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, No. 
11–3412, 2011 WL 5878359 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011); and Occupy Columbia v. Nikki 
Haley, Governor of South Carolina, No. 3:11-CV-03283, 2011 WL 6318587 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 16, 2011). 
 141. Occupy Fort Myers, 2011 WL 5554034, at *5.  
 142. Id. at *11. 
 143. Id. at *15. 
 144. Id. 
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structure in city parks.145  The district court’s decision left open the 
possibility that protesters could remain in Centennial Park, and even 
sleep there overnight, providing no tents or other structures were 
used, but two days later, Fort Myers police kicked Occupy Fort Myers 
out of the park after rejecting the group’s permit renewal applica-
tion.146  No further legal action was taken by the protesters. 
Agreeing with the “well-reasoned” conclusion in Occupy Fort My-
ers, the Minnesota district court, in Occupy Minneapolis v. County of 
Hennepin,147 found that Occupy Minneapolis protesters could “chal-
lenge the ban on sleeping and erecting structures under the First 
Amendment.”148  Citing Clark, the court nonetheless found that a 
Resolution banning sleeping and erecting tents and other structures 
on a plaza next to the Minneapolis government center was a valid 
time, place and manner restriction.149  Similarly, in Occupy Columbia 
v. Haley,150 the district court found that “the Plaintiffs are likely to es-
tablish that Occupy Columbia’s camping on the State House grounds 
is expressive conduct, as defined by Spence,”151 but upheld a newly 
enacted “emergency regulation” banning camping and sleeping.152 
Although these courts have gone beyond Clark, in that they explic-
itly held, as opposed to just assumed, that sleeping and camping as 
part of an Occupy protest is protected by the First Amendment, the 
end result is still the same.  In keeping with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Clark, all three district courts found that camping and 
sleeping were ultimately divisible from the First Amendment activity 
in which Occupy protesters are engaging, and that a balancing of the 
equities permits municipalities to promulgate and enforce total bans 
on these aspects of Occupy demonstrations. Implicit in these deci-
sions is the belief that the “major value” of sleep is “facilitative”153; 
 
 145. Fort Myers, Fl., Code of Ordinances § 58–153(3). 
 146. Chris Umpierre, Occupy Fort Myers Protesters Leave South Fort Myers 
Camp, FORT MYERS NEWS-PRESS (Dec. 1, 2011), http://beta.news-
press.com/article/20111201/NEWS0110/111201020/1075/Lee-County-existing-home-
sales--prices-fall-in-July. 
 147. Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, No. 11–3412, 2011 WL 5878359 
(D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011). 
 148. Id. at *4.  
 149. Id. at *5. 
 150. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-CV-03283, 2011 WL 6318587 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 16, 2011). 
 151. Id. at *8. 
 152. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-CV-03253, 2011 WL 6698990, at *6–7 
(D.S.C. Dec. 22, 2011). 
 153. Clark v. Cmty. of Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984). 
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that the courts thus far have not attributed significant symbolic value 
to occupation-style protests and that they do not view sleeping and 
camping as integral components of the expressive conduct taking 
place. 
If the district courts in Occupy Fort Myers, Occupy Minneapolis 
and Occupy Columbia had found, like Judge Wood in Metropolitan 
Council, that sleeping at Occupy demonstrations “plays a more signif-
icant expressive role relative to other aspects of the protest,”154 then a 
total ban would be constitutionally problematic under a time, place, 
manner analysis, which assumes that the actor is still free to engage in 
the same form of expression at another time, in another place, or in 
another manner, and therefore only requires that the government 
leave open ample alternative channels.  By banning sleeping and 
camping, municipalities are unconstitutionally changing the protest-
ers’ message, transforming occupations into other, more acceptable, 
forms of protest.  If Occupy protesters are ever to win the right to oc-
cupy, they must show the courts that in the context of Occupy demon-
strations, the medium is truly the message.  Sleeping and camping are 
at the heart of what it means to literally occupy a space, and that oc-
cupations, which involve the creation of a community that has a con-
tinuous, twenty-four-hour presence, are expressive acts.  This is the 
logic of the majority in CCNV II, which ultimately held that the de-
monstrators’ “proposed sleeping is expressive in nature and that the 
Park Service has not justified a total ban on that activity.”155 
Beyond arguing that sleep in the context of Occupy demonstrations 
is an integral part of the message being expressed, Occupy plaintiffs 
must also push for real scrutiny of the government interests that are 
asserted to justify the evisceration of this message.  Judge Wood’s 
analysis in Metropolitan Council is instructive here, as it shows that a 
government’s interests in prospectively preventing criminal conduct is 
insufficient to justify a prior restraint on speech.  Other governmental 
interests that are frequently asserted in cases that involve sleeping 
and camping at twenty-four-hour protests—preserving the aesthetic 
condition of public spaces, preserving the use of those spaces for the 
public, sanitation issues, the overburdening of law enforcement, and 
an increase in requests for sleeping and camping—must also be care-
fully weighed against the First Amendment rights of Occupy protest-
 
 154. Metropolitan Council Inc. v. Safir, 99 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 155. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt (CCNV II), 703 F.2d 586, 604 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983). 
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ers.  The issue is not whether the interests asserted by the government 
are legitimate in the abstract, but whether the government’s interests 
are furthered by banning sleeping and camping at Occupy demonstra-
tions. 
One of the fundamental distinctions between the analysis of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 
CCNV II and the Supreme Court’s decision in Clark v. CCNV, is that 
in CCNV II, the D.C. Court looked to see if the government’s inter-
ests were actually furthered by banning sleeping at the CCNV protest 
(in which a twenty-four-hour presence in symbolic tents was already 
permitted), while the Supreme Court held that it was free to look be-
yond CCNV’s protest to the possibility that other groups would de-
mand permission to deliver their message by camping in National 
Parks.  Because these possible future protests might expose the parks 
to harm, the Supreme Court found that a regulation banning camping 
and sleeping was a reasonable time, place and manner restriction.  
But despite the Clark court’s willingness to look beyond the CCNV 
action to a speculated parade of future horribles in order to justify a 
government regulation, Occupy plaintiffs must fight to keep the focus 
on Occupy demonstrations, and the actual impact of their expressive 
conduct on the interests asserted by the government. 
If a government restriction is viewed as content neutral, then ac-
cording to the Supreme Court it need not be the “least restrictive or 
least intrusive means” of advancing the government’s interest.156  “So 
long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary 
to achieve the government’s interest, however, the regulation will not 
be invalid simply because a court concludes that the government’s in-
terest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive al-
ternative.”157  But if the government’s intent in passing the regulation 
was to restrict a particular form of expression, then the regulation 
cannot stand.  In keeping with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Tex-
as v. Johnson, Occupy plaintiffs should push for judicial review of leg-
islative intent in enacting bans on sleeping and camping, and for a 
higher level of scrutiny in cases where there is a clear intent to sup-
press a particular message or form of expression.158  This emphasis is 
particularly important in the context of Occupy cases, in which regu-
 
 156. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). 
 157. Id. at 798–99. 
 158. As discussed in greater detail above, the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson 
declined to apply the O’Brien test, finding that the government’s interest in preserv-
ing the flag revealed its intent to suppress free expression. 
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lations prohibiting sleeping and camping may not have existed prior 
to the start of the Occupy movement, and in some cases were hastily 
promulgated for the express purpose of regulating a particular Occu-
py demonstration. 
For example, in Occupy Columbia, District Judge Cameron 
McGowan Currie initially granted a temporary restraining order on 
the grounds that the City of Columbia’s unwritten policy prohibiting 
sleeping and camping violated the First Amendment rights of the pro-
testers,159 but later held that an emergency regulation prohibiting 
camping and sleeping, enacted just four days after the temporary in-
junction was granted, was an acceptable time, place and manner re-
striction.160  While the plaintiffs argued that the new regulation was 
motivated by the defendant’s frustration with Occupy Columbia, 
Judge McGowan Currie cited O’Brien161 as support for her refusal to 
delve into legislative intent.  Judge McGowan Currie’s reliance on 
O’Brien, however, is misplaced.  As Professor Lawrence H. Tribe ob-
served: “[T]he broad statement of the Court in O’Brien concerning 
the limited relevance of legislative motive in constitutional adjudica-
tion must be strongly qualified.”162  The Supreme Court can and does 
engage in close scrutiny of the purpose behind statutes that abridge 
speech.163  In this context, the City of Columbia’s emergency regula-
tion banning sleeping and camping should have been vigorously scru-
tinized, as the timing of its passage demonstrates that the intent of the 
ban was to end the Occupy protest on State House grounds. 
In general, courts should be skeptical of facially neutral time, place 
and manner regulations.  Even if the intent of legislators was not to 
 
 159. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-CV-03283, 2011 WL 6318587 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 16, 2011). 
 160. Occupy Columbia v. Haley, No. 3:11-CV-03253, 2011 WL 6698990 (D.S.C. 
Dec. 22, 2011). 
 161. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 162. LARRY H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 825 (2d ed. 1988). Tribe 
uses Cornelius v. N.A.A.C.P., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) to illustrate this point. Cornelius 
held that the test to determine whether a forum that is created by the government 
must be open to all speakers on an equal basis is dependent upon “whether [the gov-
ernment] intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly and debate 
as a public forum.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.  
 163. Id.  For example, in Washington v. Davis, Justice White wrote for the majori-
ty: “To the extent that [some of our cases suggest] a generally applicable proposition 
that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our prior cases . . . 
are to the contrary.” 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.11 (1976); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971) (dealing with the issue of public financing for private schools and an-
nouncing that the validity of public aid to church-related schools requires close in-
quiry into the purpose of the challenged statute). 
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suppress free expression, these regulations frequently have a dispar-
ate impact on communicators without the means to otherwise com-
municate their message.  As the late Professor Harry Kalven ob-
served, “We would do well to avoid the occasion for any new 
epigrams about the majestic equality of the law prohibiting the rich 
man, too, from distributing leaflets or picketing.”164  Leafleting, pick-
eting, street demonstrations, sit-ins and occupations are vastly more 
important tools to communicators among “the 99%” than they are to 
the wealthy, who have ample alternative means to amplify their mes-
sage. 
In New York City, the birthplace of the Occupy movement, the 
twenty-four-hour occupation of Zuccotti Park continued uninterrupt-
ed for almost two months, from September 17, 2011 until it was 
cleared by the New York City Police Department in the early hours 
of November 15, 2011.165  There is no city regulation barring camping 
and sleeping in the park. Instead, protesters were evicted on the basis 
of unofficial rules posted by Brookfield properties, the park’s private 
landlord, several days after Occupy Wall Street began its occupa-
tion.166  Although lawyers for the protesters initially obtained an 
emergency temporary restraining order from Justice Lucy Billings 
barring the city and Brookfield properties from evicting protesters or 
removing their belongings,167 the order was ignored by Mayor 
Bloomberg and the New York City Police Department, and promptly 
reversed by Justice Michael D. Stallman, who found that the protest-
ers had not demonstrated a First Amendment right to sleep and camp 
 
 164. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE 1ST AMENDMENT 210 (1966).  
On rare occasions, the Court has been sensitive to the discriminatory effects 
of facially neutral regulations. For example, in Martin v. City of Struthers, 
the Court held unconstitutional a ban on door-to-door distribution of leaf-
lets, stating that this method of communication “is essential to the poorly fi-
nanced causes of little people.” 
William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People and the Supreme Court: The 
Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 757, 765 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943)). 
 165. See WRITERS FOR THE 99%, supra note 4, at 206–10. 
 166. Zuccotti Park, a “Privately Owned Public Space,” must remain open on a 
twenty-four-hour basis for public use. See Current Public Plaza Standards, NEW 
YORK CITY DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/pops/plaza_ 
standards.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2012). 
 167. James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park after Protesters are 
Evicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/ 
police-begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html. 
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in the park.168  In the wake of Stallman’s decision, Zuccotti Park was 
ringed by metal barricades and guarded by police officers and 
Brookfield security personnel.  Access was limited to two “check-
points,” where members of the public were indiscriminately searched 
before entry.  After a successful campaign of complaints to the De-
partment of Buildings led to the removal of the barricades, 169 the 
state lawsuit was withdrawn.170  While Brookfield’s restrictions 
against sleeping and camping in the park remain in force, thus far, no 
federal lawsuit has been filed to challenge them.  This must not be the 
end of the story.  Occupy protesters in New York and elsewhere 
across the country should not give up the fight for the right to occupy, 
as to do so is to guarantee a decisive victory for the prior restraint of 
speech. 
CONCLUSION 
When the Supreme Court decided in Brown v. Louisiana,171 that 
protesters have a First Amendment right to engage in a sit-in in a 
public library, Justice Black, in his dissent, cautioned that the decision 
could lead to a total shut-down of public institutions: 
It means that the Constitution (the First and the Fourteenth 
Amendments) requires the custodians and supervisors of the public 
libraries in this country to stand helplessly by while protesting 
groups advocating one cause or another, stage ‘sit-ins’ or ‘stand-ups’ 
to dramatize their particular views on particular issues. And it 
should be remembered that if one group can take over libraries for 
one cause, other groups will assert the right to do so for causes 
which, while wholly legal, may not be so appealing to this Court. 
The States are thus paralyzed with reference to control of their li-
 
 168. Id. In his decision denying the temporary restraining order to Occupy Wall 
Street protesters, Justice Stallman nonetheless recognized that the protest’s effec-
tiveness was inextricably linked to its method, acknowledging that Occupy Wall 
Street has “brought attention to the increasing disparity of wealth and power in the 
United States largely because of the unorthodox tactic of occupying the subject pub-
lic space on a 24-hour basis, and constructing an encampment there.” Waller v. City 
of New York, 34 Misc. 3d 371, 372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) 
 169. Nick Pinto, Don’t Fence Me out, VILLAGE VOICE (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-01-25/news/Paula-Segal-barricades-Zuccotti-Park/. 
 170. Joseph Ax, Occupy Protesters Drop Lawsuit over Camping out, REUTERS 
(Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/24/us-occupy-lawsuit-idUST 
RE80N02620120124. 
 171. 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1965). 
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braries for library purposes, and I suppose that inevitably the next 
step will be to paralyze the schools.172 
Justice Black was right, in the sense that sit-ins have continued as a 
form of protest, in other locations, for other reasons.  But his premo-
nition that the decision would lead to the paralysis of state govern-
ments never came to pass.  We should be similarly skeptical of other 
doomsday scenarios posited by courts and state governments to justi-
fy regulating sleeping and camping out of Occupy protests.  There will 
never be a First Amendment right to a permanent occupation of pub-
lic space.  But the government cannot be permitted to over-regulate 
our ability to engage in First Amendment speech or to use traditional 
public forums to express or communicate ideas. 
Given the string of recent defeats faced by the Occupy movement 
in the courts, it may be time to consider legislative efforts to limit the 
power of municipalities to regulate the use of public space.  But re-
gardless of whether the battle is to be won in the courtroom or on the 
floors of the legislature, it must continue to be fought in the streets.  If 
there is any chance of success, the Occupy movement must engage in 
the expressive activity for which it was named, and which captured 
the attention of the media, the country, and the world; it must contin-
ue to occupy space.  The occupation of physical space is important 
and resonant, and the symbolic value far exceeds any facilitative val-
ue.  In truth, what these occupations facilitate is not the presence of 
those who remain day after day and night after night, but the full ac-
cess and participation of the rest of us.  Because of the sustained, 
twenty-four-hour presence of the Occupy movement in public spaces 
across the country, those of us who visit—in person and online—are 
able to participate in the exchange of ideas and the creation of mean-
ing taking place on the ground.  The Occupy movement has reinvig-
orated the meaning of the public forum and civic participation, and 
created a powerful new form of expression that is worth fighting for. 
 
 172. Id. at 165. 
